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Logical structure of a sentence as a 
tool for the assessment of thought 
disorder (Ancient Indian View) 
It is now well recognised that inconsis-
tancy in the spoken or written language of 
schizophrenic subjects is due to their false 
logic behind the structural aspect of sen-
tence. The defect in the schizophrenic lan-
guage is in the output rather than in the in-
put/ That is, schizophrenics can perceive 
and process language normally but they are 
impaired in some aspect of language pro-
duction (Rochester 1973). Many attempts 
have been made to find out the underlying 
factors in schizophrenics speech, as speech 
is considered as a vital sign in the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia - a hydrogenous clinical 
entity with diverse manifestations and out-
comes. 
The inherent difficulty in the demarca-
tion between thought language and speech 
has probably led to the improper unders-
tanding to schizophrenic language pheno-
menon (Lewis 1944). It has also been noted 
that the peculiar speech of schizophrenic 
does not arise of linguistic deficit rather in 
the content of the language (Bleuler 1950). 
It has been argued that the failure to distin-
guish among thought, language and speech 
leads to totological arguments such as: 
thought disorder is when talk is incoherent 
and talk is incoherent when thought is di-
sorder (Rochester and Martin 1979). Ho-
wever, the linguists have long back noted 
the distinction between thought language 
and speech i.e., language is an abstract set of 
linguistic rules whereas speech is the indi-
viduals performance created by using the 
languages rules and thought is in the back-
ground of both (Saussure 1959). Few wri-
ters and researchers believe that there is a 
language called 'schizophrenic language' 
with its own linguistic rules (Forrest 1976). 
It is further important to note the estimate 
of schizophrenic thought disorder varies 
from study to study (Andrcason and Grove 
1979; Gerson and Benson 1977). Studies 
on 'Word associationism' in the production 
of schizophrenic language has led to the hy-
pothesis of peculiar word association hie-
rarchies implying deviant semantic struc-
ture (Mednick 1958). But current studies 
have proved 'the word - association hy-
pothesis largely illusory (Schwartz 1978). 
It has been found that not only schizoph-
renics but other patients and even normals 
do make semantic and syntactic mistakes 
(Chaika 1974). And sometime it is seen that 
schizophrenics do have the ability to use at 
least syntactic if not semantic and pragmat-
ic rules (Fromkin 1975). Some researchers 
have suggested that schizophrenics langu-
age lacks normal redundancy (Rutter ct al. 
1977). Content analysis of schizophrenics 
speech is done with not much success (Laf-
fal 1979). The pragmatic deficit in schi-
zophrenic's speech has been pointed out by 
many including Ostawald (1979) and Co-
hen (1978). All these studies however, arc 
attempts only and could not tackle the 
problem. 
In the present paper, the author is of the 
opinion that the basic problem of schizophre-
nic speech has been not because of a linguistic 
deficit but due to idiosyncratic logic. The-
refore (following the lines of Bluler) it is 
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proposed that the theories of fallacies of 
reasoning (Hctwabhas) as advocated by the 
ancient Indian Nyaya Shastra (Logic) can 
be of some use to understand the schizoph-
renic speech and thus a tool can be cons-
tructed upon this theory. 
(H) 
The intimate relationship between 
mind/thought and speech is recognised in 
Indian thought right from the Vedic age. 
The word 'mati' which signifies the mean-
ing of mind also used in Rigveda for utter-
ance, prayers, hymns and everything which 
is related to vocal expression (Sharma 
1972). Later, Panini - the greatest Sanskrit 
grammarian (700 BC) crystallised the con-
cept of mind as associated with the cogni-
tive process, through the word, and held 
that spoken words had the dual functions of 
object specification and object differentia-
tion (Seal 1956). 
And finally each system of Indian Philo-
sophy in general and Nyaya System (Logic) 
in particular syntliesised this concept 
through the logical analysis of sentence. 
Nyaya Darshana's logical analysis of 
a sentence 
Nyaya Sutras were written by Gautama 
sometime in 200 A D (Dasgupta 1957). The 
purpose of his Nyaya Sutras was to deter-
mine the reality/truth by means of logi-
cal proof - a formal analysis of proposition 
and the inferential cognitive structure of a 
sentence (Pramanaiarth Pareekshanam 
Nyayah - Vatsayana's commentary on 
Nyaya Sutra 1.1) 
In order to achieve this purpose Nyaya 
darshana emphasized the need of arranging 
the words in to a sentence in a certain order, 
conforming the four conditions: These are: 
(1) expectancy or 'Akanksha'; (2) Mutual or 
semantic fitness or Yogyata; (3) Juxtaposi-
tion or Sannidhi, and (4) Intention or Tat-
paryaya (Potter Karl 1977). 
Expectancy refers to that quality of 
words of a sentence by virtue of which they 
expect or imply one another. For example, 
when one hears the word 'bring' one at 
once asks 'what' ? Thus, when the expres-
sion is 'bring a glass of water' only then 
it is synthetically well-formed. 
Mutual or Semantical fitness means the 
absence of contradiction in the relation of 
objects denoted by a sentence. The expres-
sion 'watering with fire' is an example, 
where semantical fitness is lacking. 
Juxtaposition indicates the absence of 
long interval between the two spoken 
words. For example 'I... go' will not make a 
sentence if uttered in two hours time. 
When spoken as 'I go' it is juxtaposed. 
Intention is the intended meaning of a 
word. Since a word may mean different ob-
jects in different contexts, the meaning de-
pends on the particular reference on the 
part of the person who uses it. For example, 
the word 'Hari' has seven meanings in 
Sanskrit. It is the intention of the user that 
specifies the particular meaning. 
Inconsistency, therefore can be found 
with respect to any of these four conditions 
in general. But, for the assessment of higher 
thinking/reasoning of an individual, the 
principles of logic have to be applied, as log-
ic is directly connected with thinking and 
reasoning with respect to its consistcne and 
formal validity. 
Logical analysis though consists of a 
proper adjustment of sequence, occurence, 
co-existence, collocation and vital growth 
of object/word and meaning, Gautam 
formed his logical theory only on the basis 
of inferential cognition (Anumana) which 
in interpreted in three ways (1) Cause to ef-
fect or Purvavat; (2) effect to cause or She-
shavat; and (3) General co-relation or Sa-
manyatodrashta (Nyayasutra 1-5). 
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dised on the five basic factors of logic. 
These are: (1) Hypothesis or Pratigna; (2) 
Reason or Hetu; (3) Example of 
Udaharana; (4) Application or Upanaya; 
and (5) Conclusion or Nigamana (Nyaya 
Sutra 1 - 32). One example is enough to 
highlight all these factors: Mountain is fi-
ery (Hypothsis) - because ot smoke-posses-
sing (Reason). Wherever there is smoke, 
there is fire (example), as seen in kitchen 
(application). Therefore, mountain is fire-
possessing (Conclusion). Here, the hypo-
thesis is restated in proved terms and any 
derangement in above said process is liable 
for logical fallacies. Since, reason or 'Hetu' 
is main factor among these 5 factors, the lo-
gical fallacy is named after reason only viz., 
Fallacies of reason or "Hetwabhasa". 
Gautama has mentioned five kinds of 
fallacies of reason. (We propose these falla-
cies as the tools lor the assessment of 
thought-disorders). 
These are : (l) Discrepancy orSabyabhi-
chara: (2) Contradiction or Virudha; (3) 
Ambiguity or Prakaran - Sam; (4) Futility 
or Sadhyasam and (5) Mistimed or Kalatita 
(Nyayasutra 2.5). 
1. Discrepancy - A reason which is in-
decisive causes discrepancy. It is of three 
types (A) Ovcrwidc or Sadharana (H) Pecu-
liar or Asadharana and (C) Non-exclusive 
or Anupasamhari. The examples of these 
three will make the concept clear: 
(A) Overwide - Mountain is fiery be-
cause object-possessing; since the smoke is 
also an object, the logical statement may be 
correct, but this is not accurate as it is an 
overwide statement. 
(B) Peculiar - Sound is eternal because 
it has sound-possessing quality (Sabdah Ni-
tyah, Shabdatvvat). Though this statement 
does not isolate the laws of logic, it is failure 
to think. 
(C) Non-exclusive - Everything is 
mortal because everything is object, again 
makes no logical apprehension. 
(2) Contradiction - A reason which 
contradicts the accepted tenets is called 
contradiction (Virudha). For example, 
world is a modification (Vikara) of someth-
ing and no modification is eternal, bur the 
world continues to exist since it cannot be 
destroyed. Here, self contradiction is pres-
ent. 
(3) Ambiguity - A reason which has 
two equal arguments to support and defeat 
as in this example - sound is eternal as it is 
not created by someone and sound is non 
eternal as it is created by someone. These 
two arguments show the ambiguity. 
(4) Futility - A reason which is as much 
in need of proof as the things to be proved. 
For example - shadow is a substance be-
cause it possesses motion. It is not shown 
. that shadows move. Therefore, it is equally 
possible that they don't move. 
(5) Mistimed - A reason which is mis-
timed. For example - sound is eternal be-
cause it is manifested by contact, like co-
lour. Here the contact (between light and 
jar) which produces colour is of a different 
sort from the contact which produces 
sound. The modern Nyaya (Udayan etc. 12 
AD) has further shown the functions of 
supposition (Tarka) on 5 basis, which can 
also be measured as a tool for the asses-
sment of inconsistency (POTTER, 1977). 
These are :-
(1) Self-residence or Atmasraya - It is a 
self projection of individual that shows de-
parture from reality. 
(2) Dilemma (Anyonyasraya) - It is ina-
bility to reach a definite conclusion. 
(3) Circular argument (Chakraka) - It 
is a consecutive utterance of two or more 
sentences betraying the contextual rela-
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(4) Regression and infinite (Anavastha) 
It is reduction of a sentence to such an ex-
tent as being incognizable. 
(5) Reduction and absurdity (Prama-
badliita). It is a sort of minimizing the 
meaning of an object up to an absurd level. 
iii 
The primary analysis of speech with 
special reference to thought-process can be 
nude through two ways - that speech 
which has to do with meaning and that 
which has to do with structure of a sen-
tence. The later one is the domain of our 
present theory. Thought disorders neces-
sarily involving considerable incoherence 
in speech indicate faulty logic at work. An 
analysis of the quality of this incoherence in 
speech is attempted here, as a probable indi-
cation of thought disorder. 
The items of incoherence in the sequ-
ence of the talk is singled out and analysed 
according to: 
A) Canons and principles of ancient Indian 
Logic, 
B) The rationale in the web of ideas and the 
C) Faulty logic and clumsy expression -
understood through the conceptual func-
tions of each of the logical fallacies or 
'Hctwa bhasas* namely discrepancy, contra-
diction, ambiguity, futility and falsity. So, 
what has been presented here is the plain 
structure of these logical fallacies. A Psy-
chological test is being developed on this 
pattern to assess the capacity of 
reasoning/thought in groups of normal as 
well as schizophrenics. It is our hope and 
expectation that this paper will stimulate 
researchers in this field to find out alterna-
tive paradigm and innovative models for 
the testing of the speech of mental patients 
so as to know their thought disorder. 
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